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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s most recent affirmative-action opinion, Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1,1 suggests a new 
social climate in education reform—one in which government-forced 
integration in schools is no longer necessary, or at least not the best idea. 
Solutions to poor performance in African American schools may now 
constitutionally fall squarely within the confines of their community.2 Indirectly, 
one might view this as a call to a Black self-help model. That concept is not new; 
rather it is an old idea most notably perfected during the Montgomery Bus 
Boycotts. Ironically, a self-help concept seems to have traction across a broad 
political spectrum, from Derrick Bell, who postulates that inequity derives from 
social discrimination that is best ameliorated by large-scale government 
intervention,3 to conservatives in the judiciary, notably Justice Thomas of the 
U.S. Supreme Court.4 The historical legacy and controversy of a Black self-help 
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 1. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 2. We describe the Supreme Court’s action in Parents Involved as “race negative,” meaning that 
the Court is attempting to generate a policy that involves race as a decoupling device. In other words, 
the Court is urging a policy that treats race as a nonessential factor for government policy consideration 
in a specific domain. Essentially, race is neutralized in such policies. Under “race positive” policies, on 
the other hand, the government is seeking to protect or advance its state interests by considering race. 
 3. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 217–33 (1987) (commentary regarding 
affirmative-action policy in particular); see generally DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES OF RACIAL REFORM (2004); Derrick A. Bell, 
Jr., A Prophecy for Effective Schooling in an Uncaring World, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (2007). 
 4. See e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). For a more journalistic account of Justice Thomas’s position, see Carl Rowan, 
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model dates back to the W.E.B. DuBois and Booker T. Washington debates, 
which concerned whether Blacks would come to rely on their own industry and 
hard work within a segregated United States or instead organize around 
integrationist principles.5 
As scholars conjecture about the future impact of Parents Involved, most 
locate their discussion within the contexts of public schooling, overlooking the 
behemoth lurking beneath this pivotal decision.6 To consider the decision as 
being meaningful only to the narrow context of public-school policy overlooks 
the legal context and social climate in which the decision was rendered.7 Such a 
narrow reading of Parents Involved fails to appreciate the broader, potential 
policy implications stemming from the decision—policy implications that will 
likely affect many areas in which government decision-making relates to race. If 
this prediction is correct, there may be very useful, novel policies to emerge 
from decoupling race in government-sponsored programs. Perhaps Blacks will 
be better off foregoing government interventions in some contexts and worse 
off in others. 
In this article, we consider one slice of this decoupling by examining a 
pressing healthcare issue for all Americans, but especially for Blacks: organ 
transplantation. Organs are a scarce resource. Commentators describe organ 
transplantation as being at a “crisis” stage in the United States as Americans 
participate increasingly in underground illegal markets in China, India, Brazil, 
and other South American countries.8 Organ demand has increased in the past 
twenty years while organ supply has remained relatively constant. In 2006, 
 
Wrong Man For The EEOC, WASH. POST, Jul. 14, 1982, at A21; The Supreme Court; Clarence Thomas 
in His Own Words, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 2, 1991, at A14. Thomas’s speech to the Heritage Foundation 
provides a salient example of the interaction of Thomas’s own personal history and his highly 
individualistic stance. Clarence Thomas, Why Black Americans Should Look to Conservative Policies, 
Washington, D.C., Jun. 18, 1987, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/PoliticalPhilosophy/ 
upload/92685_1.pdf. 
 5. Compare Booker T. Washington, Address at the Opening of the Cotton States’ Exposition in 
Atlanta, Ga., September 1895, in SELECTED SPEECHES OF BOOKER T. WASHINGTON 32–36 (E. 
Davidson Washington ed., 1932), with W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 708 
(1935). 
 6. See e.g., john a. powell & Stephen Mendendian, Parents Involved: The Mantle of Brown, The 
Shadow of Plessy, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 631, 663 (2008); Theodore M. Shaw, Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 1655 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE 11, 64 (2008); 
john a. powell & Stephen Mendendian, Little Rock and the Legacy of Dred Scott, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
1153, 1183 (2008). 
 7. As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor emphasized five years earlier in Grutter, forced integration 
will not be given deference by the Court, and only well-tailored affirmative-action plans in higher 
education will pass constitutional muster. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332. 
 8. Underground markets can lead to human-rights violations. See Christian Williams, Note, 
Combating the Problems of Human Rights Abuses and Inadequate Organ Supply Through Presumed 
Donative Consent, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 315, 315 (1994). As a result of the influx of global 
demand, certain countries, including Egypt, have passed laws banning the sale of kidneys to foreigners. 
Clarisse Lucas, Egypt Becomes Crossroads for Trade in “Human Spare Parts,” AGENCE FRANCE 
PRESSE, Jan. 26, 1992. 
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approximately 53,000 people added their names to organ waitlists.9 Waitlist 
additions increase on average by 10 percent per year.10 Yet only 14,755 organs 
became available for transplant in 2006, an increase of only 3 percent from the 
year before.11 The organ-supply problem is not simple, and a backlog is 
developing on organ waitlists. Increases in government spending for 
advertisement campaigns promoting organ donation have not helped.12 More 
than 100,000 Americans are now waiting for organs in the United States, and it 
is estimated that soon the wait for some will be ten years.13 The problem is acute 
among Blacks, who comprise one third of patients on the nation’s kidney 
waitlists.14 They wait longer than all other groups15 and, while waiting, suffer the 
highest death rates of any other race on the national kidney waitlists.16 Some 
argue that if more Blacks participated as organ donors, their involvement would 
alleviate the organ shortage among them. But our research proves otherwise, at 
least in the current donation and allocation system, which does not allow donors 
to select recipients by race. 
 
 9. The Organ Procurement and Transplant Network, Waiting List Additions by Ethnicity, 
http://www.optn.org/latestData/rptData.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2007) (choose category “waiting list 
additions” and organ as “all” and count “candidates” and select “organ by ethnicity.”). 
 10. Id. Percentage change was calculated by dividing the marginal increase in individuals added to 
organ waitlists over the total number of yearly additions and multiplying by 100%. 
 11. Id. 
 12. This is not surprising, however, as the decision to donate an organ either while living or post 
mortem is complex and personal, likely insulated from the techniques that make advertisement 
persuasive. Increasing organ supply requires a government response more sensitive to the full 
complexities of the problem. Deciding to donate an organ is not the same as deciding where to shop for 
holiday gifts. Individuals cannot be expected to respond to advertisement in the same way. See 
generally, Assessing Initiatives to Increase Organ Donation, Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on 
Oversight and Investigation, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 1, 36 (2003) (prepared 
statement of Richard M. Devos) (“Educational campaigns, advertisements, enrollment drives, and all 
the methods tried up to now have yielded less than 40% of the population signing, where available, on 
the back of driver’s licenses or donor cards, and proportionally even less people joining potential donor 
organizations.”). 
 13. For an interesting study projecting future demand for kidneys in the United States, see 
Benjamin E. Hippen, In Defense of a Regulated Market in Kidneys from Living Vendors, 30 J. MED. & 
PHIL. 593, 593 (2005). Projections for patients with end-stage renal disease show a graver estimate. See 
Jay L. Xue et al., Forecast of the Number of Patients with End-Stage Renal Disease in the United States 
to the Year 2010, 12 J. AM. SOC’Y NEPHROLOGY 2753–58 (2001). 
 14. Blacks currently comprise 34.8% of those awaiting kidney transplants. The Organ Procurement 
and Transplant Network, supra note 9; see also Christopher F. Bryan et al., Allocation of Kidneys to 
Afro-American Patients is Proportional to Wait-list Composition, 28 TRANSPLANT PROC. 219–20 
(1996); Anthony J. Langone & J. Harold Helderman, Disparity Between Solid-Organ Supply and 
Demand, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 704 (2003) (“Increasing the number of black donors would not, by 
itself, alleviate these inequities, since the organs would be distributed in accordance with their 
proportionate representation on the waiting list.”). 
 15. In 2003–2004 the median waiting time for kidneys was 1313 days for Whites but 1826 days for 
Blacks. Organ Procurement and Transplant Network, All Kaplan-Meier Median Waiting Times for 
Registrations Listed: 1999–2004, http://www.optn.org/latestData/rptStrat.asp (last visited Apr. 30, 
2007). 
 16. Organ Procurement and Transplant Network, Death Removals by Ethnicity by Year, 
http://www.optn.org/latestData/rptData.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2007). 
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Economists, lawmakers, and politicians alike debate how best to increase 
organ supply. The current system for organ procurement is altruistic and frames 
the issue as one of “donation” or “gift-giving.” As an alternative, a motley crew 
of academics proposes using incentives to promote organ donation.17 They 
suggest that creating an organ market will increase supply.18 But, like the 
current system of altruistic organ donation, the market solution has drawbacks. 
Critics warn that financial incentives will commoditize organs and create the 
potential for economic coercion, such as selling organs to escape debt.19 In 
particular, they forecast that those most likely to suffer injury from financial 
incentives will be Blacks and the poor. In this article, we step aside from the 
incentives debate, as the limits of altruistic organ donation are well-vetted 
elsewhere.20 Instead, we consider a thought experiment that shifts control over 
organ allocation from donor institutions to individual donors by allowing them 
to select the race of their potential recipients. We examine the utility of 
allowing Blacks to select other Blacks (or any group they choose) as the 
recipients of their organs.21 
Further, we hypothesize that by reducing organ demand among Blacks (by 
increasing the number of Blacks donating directly to others in their 
communities), all transplant-waitlist patients will benefit, for organs that may 
have randomly been assigned to Blacks could be provided to others. Grounded 
in the new-legal-realism approach to public-policy questions,22 we advocate 
 
 17. E.g., MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS (2006) [hereinafter GOODWIN, BLACK 
MARKETS]; Gary S. Becker & Julio J. Elias, Introducing Incentives in the Market for Live and 
Cadaveric Organ Donations, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2007); Richard Epstein, Organ Transplants: Is 
Relying on Altruism Costing Lives?, AM. ENTERPRISE 50 (1993); Sally Satel, Op-Ed, Death’s Waiting 
List, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2006, at A21. 
 18. Becker & Elias, supra note 17, at 3. 
 19. See Lainie Friedman Ross & E. Steve Woodle, Ethical Issues in Increasing Living Kidney 
Donations By Expanding Kidney Paired Exchange Programs, 69 TRANSPLANTATION 1539, 1542 
(2000); Francis Delmonico et al., Ethical Incentives—Not Payment—for Organ Donation, 346 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 2002–05 (2002); see also Gilbert Meileander, Gifts of the Body, NEW ATLANTIS (Summer 
2006). Yet it is important to evaluate whether such drawbacks justify the current legal prohibition 
against the exchange of consideration for organs given the number of lives potentially saved by 
increases in supply. 
 20. See, e.g., GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS, supra note 17; Sally L. Satel & Benjamin E. Hippen, 
When Altruism is Not Enough: The Worsening Organ Shortage and What it Means to the Elderly, 15 
ELDER L. J. 153, (2007). 
 21. If social injustices result, the policy proposal may do more harm than good. But this is an 
empirical question as to whether utilization of racial preferences will be detrimental to general race 
relations. And it is a separate normative question as to whether marginal decreases in race relations are 
more valuable than gains in organ supply. 
 22. The new-legal-realism approach is commonly associated with the use of empirical models and 
testable hypotheses to understand the impetus behind judicial opinions. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & 
Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006). However, the new-legal-realist approach is also used by scholars in other 
contexts. See, e.g., Thomas W. Mitchell, Destabilizing the Normalization of Rural Black Land Loss: A 
Critical Role for Legal Empiricism, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 557 (2005); Gregory C. Shaffer, A New Legal 
Realism: Method in International Economic Law Scholarship, (Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
09-02), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105498 (forthcoming). 
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piercing the veil of ignorance behind which less socially responsive policy is 
formed and argue for regulations that reflect the concerns and sensitivities of 
those individuals whom they affect. 
In part II, we analyze effects of the current organ-allocation system on 
Blacks. Our analysis suggests that the current system’s discriminatory impact 
coupled with a well-documented history of medical exploitation experienced by 
Blacks predisposes members of that community to distrust the organ-transfer 
system as a whole. This distrust in turn creates a disincentive for Blacks to 
become organ donors. Part III captures the crux of our thought experiment. In 
this section, we describe and contextualize the race-preference hypothesis. Part 
IV forecasts and responds to the primary legal objections that such a policy 
proposal might engender, most notably that such a system violates the altruistic 
mandate of the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA)23 or that the use of 
racial criteria is unconstitutional. Part V concludes. 
II 
RACIAL PREFERENCES AND ORGAN-TRANSFER SYSTEMS: AN EMPIRICAL 
STUDY AND A PROPOSAL 
Proponents of radical changes in the U.S. organ-transplant system often 
claim that NOTA creates significant barriers to increasing organ supply. 
NOTA, they claim, is too restrictive.24 They are right. NOTA prohibits 
exchanging organs for “valuable consideration.”25 Violation of NOTA can result 
in a felony conviction carrying a five-year prison term and $50,000 fine.26 Read 
broadly, “valuable consideration” extends beyond financial exchanges to 
encompass direct donations27 and solicited donations.28 Only recently have 
 
 23. The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 273–74 (2006)). 
 24. See, e.g., Michele Goodwin, Confronting the Limits of Altruism: A Response to Jake Linford, 2 
ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 327 (2009); Robert Steinbuch, Kidneys, Cash, and Kashrut: A 
Legal, Economic, and Religious Analysis of Selling Kidneys, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1529 (2009); Eugene 
Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 1813 (2007). 
 25. NOTA, supra note 23 at § 274(e)(a). 
 26. Id. at § 274(b). 
 27. Though direct donations do not involve monetary transfer, given the international black 
market in organ trade, there is a shadow market price (value) inherent in the exchange itself. See 
generally Charles T. Calstrom & Christy D. Rollow, The Rationing of Transplantable Organs: A 
Troubled Lineup, 17.2 CATO J. 163, (1997). But see Memorandum Opinion for the General Counsel 
Department of Health and Human Services, Legality of Alternative Organ Donation Practices Under 
42 U.S.C. § 274(e) 31 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1 (2000), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
olc/2007/organtransplant.pdf. (memorandum concluding certain arrangements for donations of kidneys 
by living donors do not involve “valuable consideration”). 
 28. Arthur Caplan argues that solicited donation undercuts the “ability of the system to get organs 
to those most in need.” ARTHUR CAPLAN, HEALTH, DISEASE, AND ILLNESS: CONCEPTS IN MEDICINE 
(2004). But see Richard A. Epstein, The Human and Economic Dimensions of Altruism: The Case of 
Organ Transplantation, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 459 (2008). (In relevant part, Epstein analyzes the effect of 
organ solicitation on the supply and demand of organs.). 
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paired donations been lifted from the offensive-crimes category.29 Some doctors 
and hospitals refuse to perform these alternative transplants, arguing that even 
if the law is not enforced as to them, these types of donations violate the spirit 
of the transplant policy and harm the interests of waitlist patients.30 Nor does it 
appear that the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), the organization 
that coordinates organ-transplantation policy for the U.S. government, is 
sympathetic to these entrepreneurial efforts to increase organ supply.31 
Programs caught under this type of scrutiny include novel Internet sites like 
Matchingdonor.com, which works like a cross between Facebook and a dating 
web site. Patients post their stories and potential donors read their biographies, 
looking for the story that triggers a connection or empathy.32 
A. The Discriminatory Impact of the Current Organ-Transfer System 
The current organ-allocation system is a colorblind process that relies on 
Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) matching of donors and recipients to 
determine the priority for individuals awaiting organs.33 HLA are antigens 
found on the surface of all cells, including kidney cells and the cells of other 
organs available for donations.34 These antigens help the human body determine 
if an object is foreign.35 This information then helps the immune system 
determine whether to fight new cells entering the body.36 Differences between 
 
 29. Charlie W. Norwood Living Organ Donation Act, Pub. L. No. 110-144 (2007). The paired-
donor arrangement is at its core a quid pro quo situation. Two donors each provide a kidney to the 
other’s intended recipient. Thus this form of donation resembles most the arm’s length contract 
arrangement presumably prohibited by NOTA. The UNOS does not find valuable consideration in any 
living donor arrangement. See Williams Mullen, Position Statement: Kidney Paired Donations, Kidney 
List Donations and NOTA § 301, Sept. 18, 2006, at 3, http:// www.unos.org/ 
ContentDocuments/NOTA_301_Position_Paper_-_September_18,_2006.pdf. Senator Carl Levin has 
introduced The Living Kidney Organ Donation Clarification Act, to clarify “ambiguous language” in 
Section 301 of NOTA. The bill seeks to assure that kidney paired donation is not the purchase of an 
organ. See Bills Clarifying Kidney Paired Donation Doesn’t Violate NOTA’s Valuable Consideration 
Ban Introduced in Congress, TRANSPLANT NEWS, Feb. 2007, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/ 
mi_m0YUG/is_/ai_n24241971. 
 30. See Organ Donor Club Grows, Has Critics, UNITED PRESS INT’L, June 14, 2006 (“Dr. Douglas 
Hanto of Harvard Medical School said organs should go to the person who needs it the most, not to 
people because they are members of a club.”); Virginia Postrel, Editorial, “Unfair” Kidney Donations, 
FORBES, June 5, 2006, at 124 (quoting Dr. Douglas Hanto regarding Harvard’s policy concerning organ 
transplants that involve solicitation and negotiations outside of the UNOS waitlist process: “[W]e won’t 
do them.”). 
 31. See UNOS, How You Can Help, available at http://www.unos.org/HowYouCanHelp/ 
promoteOrganDonation (making no mention of entrepreneurial efforts for organ donation). 
 32. Sarah Robbins, We Love Tom Simon Because . . . He Donated a Kidney to a Woman He Barely 
Knew, GLAMOUR, Feb. 2008, available at http://www.matchingdonors.com/life/pdfdocs/Tom3.pdf. 
 33. See Jed Adam Gross, E Pluribus Unos: The National Organ Transplant Act and Its 
Postoperative Complications, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 145, 157 (2008). 
 34. Beth W. Colombe, Transplantation Immunology: Histocompatibility, in MANUAL OF ALLERGY 
AND IMMUNOLOGY FOURTH EDITION (Daniel C. Adelman, Thomas B. Casale, & Jonathan Corren 
eds., 2002). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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donor and recipient HLA may cause the body to reject an organ.37 For 
transplantation purposes, however, a donor’s HLA does not have to be an exact 
match to a recipient’s HLA.38 
Thomas Starzyl’s groundbreaking study in the Lancet over a decade ago 
provided compelling evidence that an exact match was not required. Starzyl 
suggested that matching even between parents and their children gives “no 
better early or late results than kidneys from randomly matched living spouses 
or other nonrelatives.”39 More important, with development of 
immunosuppressant drugs, organ rejection is less of a concern today than when 
the HLA-matching system was first developed in 1987.40 The problem with 
organizing transplantation around such an antiquated process is that it reduces 
the likelihood that donors who are not “perfect” matches will give to third 
parties. 
Table 1 : Organ Allocation and Transplantation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ironically, despite the color-blind intent and nature of the organ-allocation 
system, it results in non–race-neutral outcomes by systemically disadvantaging 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. See, e.g., Luis Almenar et al., Influence of HLA Matching on Survival in Heart Transplants, 37 
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 4001 (concluding that “[a] higher degree of HLA-A, -B, and -DR matching 
did not have a positive effect on heart transplant patient survival, rejection episodes or infection.”). For 
a discussion of HLA matching in kidney transplantations, see Xuanming Su et al., Diminishing 
Significance of HLA Matching in Kidney Transplantation, 4 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1501–08 (2004). 
 39. Thomas E. Strazl & John J. Fung, The Politics of Grafting Cadaver Kidneys, 348 LANCET 454 
(1996). 
 40. Vikas R. Dharnidharka, Donald M. Stablein, & William E. Harmon, Post-Transplant Infections 
Now Exceed Acute Rejection as Cause for Hospitalization: A Report of the NAPRTCS, 4 AM. J. 
TRANSPLANTATION 3, abstract (2004). See also Margaret R. Sobota, The Price of Life: $50,000 for an 
Egg, Why Not $1,500 for a Kidney? An Argument to Establish a Market for Organ Procurement Similar 
to the Current Market for Human Egg Procurement, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1225, 1226 (2004). 
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Blacks. Racial disparities in transplantation waiting times, death rates, and need 
persist at alarming rates. As of December 15, 2007, 98,117 people in the United 
States were awaiting organ transplantation.41 Blacks comprised 34% of those 
awaiting kidney transplants—more than any other single racial group—and 
28% were awaiting organs in general.42 Despite comprising approximately one-
third of those individuals awaiting organs on organ waitlists, Blacks did not 
receive a proportionate share of those organs transplanted. Whites received 
62.1% of organ transplantations in 2007, while Blacks and other minorities 
received 19.3% and 18.6% respectively. Table 1 summarizes the disparity 
between Black composition on the national organ waitlist and as part of the 
population of individuals receiving organs. Blacks comprise more than one-
third of the waitlist, however, they receive less than one third of all organs and 
less than half the number of organs allocated to White patients. (Table 1). 
Our research reveals that the current prioritizing method for the distribution 
of organs may also contribute to racial disparities. From 1999 through 2004, the 
median wait time for a kidney for a White patient was 1255 days, whereas for 
their Black counterparts the median wait time was 1781 days.43 Table 2 
compares the median waiting time for Blacks and Whites on the UNOS organ 
wait-list from 1999 through 2004. In addition to longer wait time, Black patients 
also experience the highest death rate of any ethnic population on the 
transplant waitlist.44 The data in Table 2 demonstrate that the current allocation 
system “generally ignores African American organ consumers and recipients, 
and focuses almost exclusively on the quality of their organs as donors.”45 The 
disparate impact of contemporary transplant policy is irrefutable. Blacks are 
systemically at the “back of the bus” for organ transplants and often die as a 
result. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 41. The Organ Procurement and Transplant Network, Data, http://www.optn.org/data/ (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2007). 
 42.  Id. (choose category “waiting list”; count “candidates”; select “organ by ethnicity”) (listing 
25,649 African American kidney-transplant candidates, listing 27,659 African Americans awaiting 
transplant of any organ). 
 43. Id. (Kidney Kaplan-Meier Median Waiting Times for Registrants Listed 1999-2004, available at 
http://www.optn.org/latestData/rptStrat.asp (last visited Dec. 15, 2007) (choose category “median 
waiting time”; choose organ “kidney”; select “waiting time by ethnicity”). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Michele Goodwin, 2007 Survey of Books Related to the Law: Public Policy: Private Ordering 
and Intimate Spaces: Why the Ability to Negotiate is Non-Negotiable, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1367, 1371 
(emphasis in original). 
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Table 2: Mean Waiting Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Black Distrust of the Organ-Transfer System Creates Disincentives for 
Participation as Organ Donors 
There is limited empirical information available concerning the interplay 
between the racial disparities present in the organ-allocation process and 
individual choice on whether to become an organ donor. The available data 
suggests, at least among Blacks, a strong connection. From 2002 through 2004, 
the African American Organ Transplant Study I (AAOTS I) conducted an 
empirical assessment of 588 African Americans’ perception of the current 
altruistic organ-donation system.46 The researchers hypothesized that the 
existing differential between Blacks’ approval of organ donation and donor 
registration was not due to registration obstacles alone, but rather to a more 
general, but overlooked, “breach of confidence or lack of trust in the current 
transplantation and procurement system.”47 The study was followed by forty in-
depth, qualitative interviews (African American Organ Transplant Study II, 
(AAOTS II)). Together, the two studies may have answered much more than 
the question originally addressed. They revealed that a more-subtle race tension 
exists when Blacks interact with the current organ-procurement- and allocation 
system—“participants perceived the altruistic process to be manipulative and a 
veiled effort to sacrifice African Americans to save White Americans.”48 
Ironically, even the more sophisticated study participants—including a banker, 
 
 46. African American Organ Transplant Studies I and II (conducted in Chicago) (hereinafter 
AAOTS I and II). For a discussion of the African American Organ Transplant Studies I and II, see 
GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS, supra note 17, at 49–53. 
 47. GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS, supra note 17, at 48. 
 48. Id. 
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a physician, a nurse, and school teachers—believed that the transplant-
allocation system was biased, if not by race then by socio-economic status.49 
Study participants were generally cynical about whether the UNOS 
allocation system benefited Blacks. One participant went so far as to suggest 
that “efforts to encourage African Americans to donate were part of a 
conspiracy ‘because they were going to use Black people as spare parts . . . 
when White people are sick . . . they’ll have a means to get their organs.’”50 This 
data suggests that Blacks perceive a lack of control in the altruistic process. 
D.B., a Chicago area school teacher urged that African Americans should “stay 
together as a people,” implying that African Americans should be able to 
determine the recipients of their organs.51 Allowing for potential donors to 
control the race, culture, religion, or gender of their recipients may be one way 
in which an organ-transfer system can provide this type of control. Further data 
from the AAOTS I and II studies suggest the same: 
For example, in AAOTS I when survey participants were asked whether they are 
registered to donate, only 36% answered affirmatively. However, when asked whether 
they would be willing to donate if the recipients were Black, over 58% answered 
positively. Thus, the concept of organ sharing is not the problem; fewer than 10% of 
those surveyed opposed donation. Indeed, Blacks were more willing to donate when 
they believed African Americans would be treated equitably in both the procurement 
and allocation process.52 
The critical issue for Blacks with regard to organ transplantation may be 
control, or the perceived lack of it. After being asked whether mandatory 
donations would benefit African Americans, one participant concluded, 
“[N]o[,] . . . because they are going to give it to the white person.”53 This 
participant suggested that even poorer, working-class Whites would be 
privileged by receiving organs over their Black counterparts.54 Another African 
American teacher, Y.C., attributed present organ donation among African 
Americans to the desire to save the lives of other Blacks. According to Y.C., 
 
 49. Interview with D.B., November 21, 2003. D.B., a school teacher, believed that African 
Americans were lower on the transplant waitlists because of their “socio-economic situation.” D.B. also 
thought African Americans should be paid to donate their organs because of this. He went on to say 
that financial incentives might be acceptable if it provided a “means of breaking a horrific cycle which 
your family may be in as far as economics are concerned and you wanted your children to have a better 
chance at life to be on the same playing field as our white counterparts, I think that it will be a decision 
that I would make without hesitation . . . .” Interview with D.B., Chicago, IL (Nov. 21, 2003). 
 50. Interview with K. (quoted in GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS, supra note 17, at 50); Interview 
with D.B., supra note 49. 
 51. Interview with D.B., supra note 49. 
 52. GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS, supra note 17, at 52. 
 53. Interview with S.B., Nov. 21, 2003; Interview with D.B., Chicago, IL (Nov. 21, 2003). S.B. was 
thirty-four years old when interviewed. She was clear to acknowledge that she would readily surrender 
a kidney to a relative, but seemed very mistrustful of organ donation in general because she believed 
African Americans would more likely be passed over on the allocation side. 
 54. Id. 
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African Americans participate in organ donation “because they want to insure 
that African Americans get the organs that they need.”55 
AAOTS-participant responses suggest that the decision to participate in 
organ transfers is animated by more than the consideration of whether to give. 
And, in general, many express concern over destroying the sanctity of the 
human body or the ability to live with one kidney.56 Yet at least in the case of 
Black participants, such choices are also ensnared with broader and complex 
racial considerations. 
Earlier work suggested that the racial undercurrent present in the altruistic 
organ-transfer system may be due to unintended consequences in the allocation 
of organs.57 Procurement and allocation are intimately interwoven. The system 
cannot give what it does not have, and how it presently gives has been 
characterized as pernicious, unfair, and inequitable.58 But a deeper racial tension 
may also be at play. To deter organ donation, actual injustice and inequity in 
the allocation of organs is not necessary: Blacks’ perceptions of the current 
organ-transfer system as privileging Whites might derive from broader 
conceptions of social injustice rather than from any particular knowledge of 
allocation inequity. If this hunch is correct, then even in the face of economic 
incentives, certain individuals might abstain from participating in the organ-
transfer system based on concerns about equitable distribution to Blacks. To 
encourage Black donation, a procurement system would have to compensate 
individuals not only for the value of their organs, but also for the value of 
participating in a system that reinforces racial inequalities and social injustice. 
In contrast, allowing for racial preferences in an incentive model might lead to 
“discounts” based on race. 
C. Past Abuses of Blacks in the Health-Care Context Contribute to the 
Perceived Inequality 
Historical disparities in the treatment of Blacks within the American 
healthcare system may also contribute to perceptions of racial inequalities and 
social injustice in the organ transplant system. Distrust among Blacks of the 
American healthcare system is well-documented.59 This distrust may be “a 
natural and logical response to the history of experimentation and abuse” 
 
 55. Interview with Y.C., Oct. 27, 2003. 
 56. FAQ: Common Concerns about Organ Donation, READERS DIGEST, Dec. 2, 2007, http:// 
www.readersdigest.com.au/content/34604/. Individual participants in the Goodwin study demonstrated 
similar concerns. See GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS, supra note 17, at 51. 
 57. Michele Goodwin, The Body Market: Race Politics and Private Ordering, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 599, 
607–10 (2007) [hereinafter Goodwin, The Body Market]; see generally, GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS, 
supra note 17. 
 58. GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS, supra note 17, at 53. 
 59. See, e.g., HARRIET WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF MEDICAL 
EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (2007). 
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suffered by Blacks.60 The use of Blacks in medical experiments can be traced 
back to the antebellum period; from slavery to the present, scholars document a 
troubling medical story that involves medical research and the absence of 
ethical or scientific protocols to protect the interests of coerced participants.61 
Among the more indelicate stories illustrating research and medical abuse 
experienced by African Americans are the gynecological experiments 
conducted by Marion Sims on enslaved Black women without the aid of 
anesthesia62 and the U.S. Public Health Service study, otherwise known as the 
infamous Tuskegee Syphilis Study, underwritten by the federal government, 
and lasting over forty years.63 Other incidents of government-sponsored medical 
studies and experimentation on Blacks included medical sterilizations targeting 
Black women on welfare and drug testing on Black children in foster care.64 
Reports about such experiments are troubling but no longer raise the allegation 
of faulty data, conspiracy theory, or hypersensitivity among Blacks.65 Yet other 
experiments, confirmed by FBI and CIA reports, seem absolutely outlandish 
and are difficult to understand, as the data collected certainly provided little if 
any potential medical benefit for Blacks or other Americans. Consider the 
mosquito studies conducted in Florida and Georgia where mosquitoes were 
released in Black communities to determine the effectiveness of insect warfare 
on US Cold War enemies.66 Equally the radiation studies, in which Blacks and 
poor Whites were injected with plutonium by government-funded scientists 
could hardly be justified to those communities nor meet the international 
ethical protocols of the time.67 Finally, consider Dr. Albert Kligman’s 
 
 60. Vernellia R. Randall, Slavery, Segregation and Racism: Trusting the Health Care System Ain’t 
Always Easy! An African American Perspective on Bioethics, 15 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 191, 191 
(1996). 
 61. E.g., WASHINGTON, supra note, 59 at 7–8. See also Goodwin & Richardson, Panel Discussion 
at Duke Law School Symposium: Race and Socio-Economic Class: Unraveling an Increasingly 
Complex Tapestry (Jan. 23, 2009) (discussing in more detail these experiments, the Tuskegee Study, 
among other government-sponsored experimentation on Blacks). 
 62. See generally J. MARION SIMS, THE STORY OF MY LIFE (1968). See also Goodwin & 
Richardson, supra, note 61. 
 63. Stephen B. Thomas & Sandra Crouse Quinn, The Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 1932 to 1972: 
Implications for HIV Education and AIDS Risk Education Programs in the Black Community, 81 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 1498, 1499–1502 (1991); see also Randall, supra note 60, at 191 (“The Tuskegee 
Experiment involved four hundred African American men in a government-sponsored study to 
research the effects of untreated syphilis. While the men were not deliberately exposed to syphilis, as 
rumored, they were never told that they were not being treated or that effective treatment was 
available.”). 
 64. WASHINGTON, supra note 59, at 202–06, 335–37. 
 65. See, e.g., id. at 9–13, 21–22. 
 66. Id. at 361–62. 
 67. See generally CATHY O’BRIEN & MARK PHILLIPS, TRANCE FORMATION OF AMERICA (1995); 
GORDON THOMAS, JOURNEY INTO MADNESS: THE TRUE STORY OF SECRET CIA MIND CONTROL 
AND MEDICAL ABUSE (1989). 
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dermatological studies conducted on inmates at Holmesburg Prison, most of 
whom were Black and did not reap the benefits of study’s results.68 
By comparison, the highly controversial sickle-cell screening programs of 
the 1960s and 1970s seem mundane in their discriminatory reach. Nevertheless, 
those screening initiatives provide another historical reason for the unease and 
distrust that some Blacks carry as part of a community medical experience. 
Often the experiences are not direct (and may be significantly attenuated), but 
Blacks tend to view the harms, coercion, and fraud experienced by other Blacks 
as a collective experience.69 In other words, these cases serve as warnings. In 
particular, the sickle-cell screening programs provide a glimpse from a different 
angle at medical uncertainty. 
The sickle-cell screening tests were minimally invasive; however, 
participants grew concerned about how their medical information might be 
misused for untoward or unjust purposes: 
Some states passed legislation requiring all African American children entering school 
to be screened for the sickle-cell trait, even though there was no treatment or cure for 
the sickle-cell disease. Some states required prisoners to be tested, even though there 
would be no opportunity for them to pass on the trait. Job and insurance 
discrimination were both real and attempted. The military considered banning all 
African Americans from the armed services. African American airline stewardesses 
were fired. Insurance rates went up for carriers. Some companies refused to insure 
carriers. During that period, many African Americans came to believe that the sickle-
cell screening initiative was merely a disguised genocide attempt, since often the only 
advice given to African Americans with the trait was, “Don’t have kids.”70 
It is perhaps this fear—rational or not—and grounded in isolated but not 
infrequent medical fraud, mishaps, and missteps that leads many Blacks to 
believe that core principles of bioethics (such as autonomy, beneficence, and 
justice) will not protect them or their families from medical mistreatment. A 
common thread in more than two centuries of research experimentation on 
Blacks reveals that the benefits of the studies were not intended for them.71 It is 
also clear that, despite international human research protocols such as the 
Nuremburg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, and the Declaration of Geneva, 
doctors and researchers persisted in unethical medical study involving African 
Americans, often failing to obtain full, informed consent, or mischaracterizing 
the nature of the research. Scholars might disagree as to why researchers 
ignored ethical protocols and well-established legal principles such as informed 
 
 68. Jesse Williams describes in horrid detail the transgressions that he suggests were surreptitiously 
inflicted upon him by Dr. Kligman and his colleagues. Williams describes having skin removed from his 
underarm to “study the glands,” injections of cadaveric tissue in his back, acid rubbed into his scrotum, 
and many other disturbing research experiments. Unlike many other unwitting participants, Williams 
was paid three dollars per experiment with Dr. Kligman. WASHINGTON, supra note 59, at 244–45. 
 69. See Shani M. King, Race, Identity, and Professional Responsibility: Why Legal Services 
Organizations Need African American Staff Attorneys, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 31 (2008). 
 70. Randall, supra note 60, at 201. 
 71. See, e.g., Michael Laufert, Race and Population-Based Medicine: Drug Development and 
Distributive Justice, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 859 (2008); R. Slovenko, Milestones in the Evolution of 
Standards for Experimental Treatment or Research, 25 MED. & L. 523 (2006). 
GOODWIN GEWERTZ 5/1/2010 1:14:55 PM 
264  LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 72:251 
consent when working with Blacks. One explanation might be that using Blacks 
as research subjects proved expedient and economically efficient. Or, given 
Blacks’ fractured legal and social statuses, researchers could expect minimal 
backlash. 
III 
A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT: INCORPORATING RACIAL PREFERENCES IN 
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 
Our theory is that Blacks are less likely to donate organs not because they 
are less altruistic or fundamentally opposed to such donations, but because of 
preconceived racial perceptions and fear of bias. If this is correct, then 
increased spending on government-sponsored advertisements targeted at 
Blacks will prove ineffective and inefficient. Blacks will not be swayed by the 
seductive appeal of the “gift of life” or “gift of hope” public-relations 
advertisements. For them, organ donation is burdened by history and race. 
Their concerns appear to center on two issues: (1) that doctors will hasten their 
deaths at time of sickness, which is relevant to cadaveric donations; and (2) 
whether their organs can save sick Black patients.72 If we are correct in assessing 
the “tipping point” for Blacks in the context of organ donation, it is worth 
carrying out a thought experiment that assesses whether there is any benefit to 
incorporating racial preferences in organ transplantation. To this end, we are 
interested in measuring the social and economic benefits to Black communities 
and calculating whether there is a government, and therefore larger community, 
benefit that results from this type of hypothetical policy. 
A. Allowing Organ Donors to Choose the Race of their Organ Recipients 
Currently, potential organ donors must respond positively to a single binary 
question in order to become an organ donor: Do you wish to become an organ 
donor?73 This question creates an all-or-nothing choice. Either an organ donor 
participates in the organ-procurement system by accepting the current means of 
organ allocation, including its disparate racial impact, or a potential donor may 
not donate at all. 
Instead of a single question, donor-registration forms could ask respondents 
to select desired recipients by any set of preferences, including race, by 
checking one of several boxes. Alternatively, a respondent could simply 
indicate in writing the desired race of the organ recipient. Respondents who do 
 
 72. See Patricia A. King & Leslie E. Wolf, Empowering and Protecting Patients: Lessons for 
Physician-Assisted Suicide from the African-American Experience, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1029 (1998); 
Jake Linford, The Kidney Donor Scholarship Act: How College Scholarships Can Provide Financial 
Incentives for Kidney Donation While Preserving Altruistic Meaning, 2 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 265, 286–87 (2009). 
 73. Some states also allow organ donors to specify which organs they are willing to donate. E.g., 
Conn. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, Donor Registration Card, http://www.ct.gov/dmv/lib/dmv/20/29/B-
142.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
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not wish to select a racial preference for the recipient of their organ could 
abstain from doing so either by affirmatively checking a box indicating this 
preference or failing to specify a racial preference after indicating their desire to 
become an organ donor. 
In some sense, this thought experiment merely extends existing practices. 
Private organizations, such as Matchingdonors.com, allow living donors to go 
online, read profiles of those in need of an organ, look at photos, and select 
their organ recipient.74 Thus, selection on the basis of racial preferences is 
possible. Moreover, such web sites allow living donors to foster relationships 
not otherwise available through anonymous, altruistic donation. Though no 
financial consideration is exchanged, many donor pairs become influential 
figures in each other’s lives.75 
Might the use of racial preferences to incentivize organ donations have 
nefarious distributional consequences? Some scholars raise concerns that White 
donors, who currently comprise the largest percentage of organ donors,76 will 
use racial preferences to restrict their donations to Whites. As a result, greater 
racial inequality in organ allocation will occur than in the current system. Such 
predictions are plausible but less persuasive in light of our findings. The changes 
in the ratio of Black kidney recipients to White kidney recipients varies in both 
number of kidneys available for transplantation and percentage of kidneys 
directed within each race.77 Expressed as a ratio, the current ratio of Black 
kidney-transplant recipients to White kidney-transplant recipients is 0.375. In 
contrast, the ratio of Blacks to Whites awaiting kidney transplantation on the 
waitlist is 0.88. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 74. MatchingDonors.com, http://www.matchingdonors.com/life/index.cfm (last visited Dec. 3, 
2007). 
 75. See id. (providing Patient and Donor profiles and stories). To the extent that the donor receives 
existential benefits, “giving the gift of life” is not an entirely selfless act. Value is exchanged; it is simply 
nonpecuniary in nature. 
 76. In 2006, 10,190 of the 14,755 donors were White (69.1%); 2,061 were Black (20.2%). However, 
Blacks represent 28.2% of those awaiting organs. Data includes both living and cadaveric donations. 
OPTN, Donors Recovered in the US by Donor Type, http://www.optn.org/latestData/rptData.asp (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2007). 
 77. The authors would like to thank Professor Thomas Miles for his assistance in conceptualizing 
and framing the economic analysis outlined in this section. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Current System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assuming differing rates of directed donation, only a marginal increase in 
kidney procurement from Blacks is necessary to alter the overall racial equality 
of organ allocation. 
 
Figure 2: 52% Black Procurement Rate 
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Figure 3: 75% Black Procurement Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: 52% Black and White Procurement Rate 
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Figure 5: 52% Black Participation and 72% White Participation Rate 
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to donate their organs to Black recipients.78 Third, assuming all other racial 
groups donate organs at the same rate, an increase in the absolute number of 
Black organ donors can both increase the absolute number of transplantable 
organs and decrease inequity in the current organ-allocation system, even 
assuming within-race White donation will occur. Fourth, it is unlikely that the 
altruistic White donor who contributes without preference to race currently will 
make animus-based racial decisions simply because the opportunity is available. 
Finally, even if the use of racial preferences causes some crowding out by 
driving potential donors from the current system or encourages some Whites 
previously unwilling to donate to share organs only within their ethnic 
community, the net impact will be positive for minorities awaiting transplants. 
The proportional decrease in demand from waitlisted Whites will increase the 
probability that waitlisted minorities will receive organs donated on the basis of 
HLA matching alone and without racial limitations.79 Controversial though it 
may be, objections suggesting that racial preferences will polarize organ 
disbursement ignore compelling data that current efforts at transracial, 
colorblind organ transplant policy resultin a persistent racial impact. 
B. The Economic Consequences of Including a Racial Preference 
In addition to deaths resulting from unmet organ demand in Black 
communities, the disparate effect of organ allocation creates economic 
consequences. For each Black patient on dialysis, his or her family suffers the 
economic consequences of that lost income. The ripple effect of that economic 
loss extends to their communities, both through a loss of taxable income for 
local infrastructure, including schools, and through a loss of philanthropic 
donation to community organizations, including churches, community centers, 
and fraternal organizations. These contributions are critical in sustaining 
healthy, well-functioning, safe communities. 
Blacks have considerable spending power, and this has the power to 
increase. In 2003, Black spending power was estimated at $636 billion,80 a figure 
comparable to the gross domestic product of the twentieth-wealthiest country in 
 
 78. Black philanthropic preferences may more closely align with church affiliation rather than race. 
See Alice Gresham Bullock, Taxes, Social Policy, and Philanthropy: The Untapped Potential of Middle- 
and Low- Income Generosity, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB POL’Y 325, 350 (1997) (“Historically, the Black 
church has been the core of philanthropy in the African American community.”). This suggests that 
religious rather than racial preferences are a more appropriate “framing” to incentivize Black organ 
donation. 
 79. This assumes that White transplant recipients, as a group, are prioritized above Blacks on the 
basis of HLA matching alone. There is reason to believe that this is empirically true on the basis and 
prevalence of genetic markers in the Black populations. For a discussion of this systemic effect, see 
GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS, supra note 17, at 129 (noting higher sensitivities to A, B, and DR 
antigens in Blacks); Barbara A. Noah, Racial Disparities in the Delivery of Health Care, 35 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 135, 142–47 (1998) (noting higher prevalence of positive crossmatch rate in Blacks). 
 80. Target Market News: The Black Consumer Authority, http://www.targetmarketnews.com/ 
buyingpowerstats.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2008). 
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the world—the Netherlands.81 In 2006, Black spending power was estimated at 
$799 billion,82 a figure comparable to the GDP of the seventeenth-wealthiest 
country in the world—Australia.83 Moreover, the projected percentage increase 
in Black purchasing power is greater than that of the overall purchasing power 
in America.84 In turn, not only is the economic value of Blacks significant to the 
American economy as a whole, it is becoming more valuable each day. 
In 2004, Blacks accounted for 38.3 million people in the United States,85 and 
their GDP per capita was $17,728.86 Even when completely accounting for costs 
saved from medical care and dialysis treatments, removing just one thousand 
Blacks from organ waitlists each year could add $17 million in purchasing 
power to the U.S. economy. If 2,225 organs are successfully transplanted,87 
approximately $40 million in purchasing power would be added to the U.S. 
economy. In addition, considering the federal savings from removing Blacks 
from dialysis, roughly $60–$90,000 is saved per year, per Black patient.88 Again, 
if only 100 African Americans were removed from dialysis, $6–9 million dollars 
would be saved in the first year alone. Over five years, the savings could 
multiply up to $35–45 million dollars by simply removing 100 African 
Americans from dialysis. Consequently, if 100 Black patients successfully 
received a donated organ and were removed from dialysis, the net economic 
gain over five years could be $46.7 million. There is reason to believe that such 
numbers are underestimated. Transplantation is not only the optimal medical 
treatment but also the most cost-effective treatment for patients suffering from 
kidney failure. The federal government funds both dialysis treatment and 
transplantation procedures for almost all Americans.89 Yet, after assuming such 
burdens, the Health Care Financing Administration noted that transplantation 
 
 81. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Rank Order-GDP, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html (last visited Feb. 
13, 2008). 
 82. See Vicky Eckenrode, Sway at the Supermarket: Minorities in Florida and Georgia are Spending 
Record Amounts, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Sept. 1, 2006, at D1. 
 83. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Rank Order-GDP, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/as.html. 
 84. See Jeffrey M. Humphreys, African-American Buying Power by Place of Residence: 1990–1999, 
GA. BUS. & ECON. CONDITIONS, at 1–2 (Jul.–Aug. 1998). 
 85. Black Stats, TARGET MARKET NEWS (2005), available at http://www.targetmarketnews.com/ 
storyid12080503.htm (see left side of browser window). 
 86. GDP per capita is calculated by dividing the GDP for African Americans by the number of 
African Americans present in the United States. In 2004, this meant dividing $679 Billion by 38.3 
Million. Id. 
 87. See infra note 92. 
 88. See, e.g., Michael J. Lysaght, Maintenance Dialysis Population Dynamics, 13 J. AM. SOC. 
NEPHROLOGY S37, S37 (2002). 
 89. Congress intended “to provide access to life-saving therapy for all who needed it where the 
costs of treatment were beyond the means of practically all individuals.” See RICHARD A. RETTIG & 
ELLEN L. MARKS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., IMPLEMENTING THE END-STAGE 
RENAL DISEASE PROGRAM OF MEDICARE 25 (1981) (Health Care Financing Grants and Contracts 
Report). 
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was the most cost-effective means of treating patients with irreversible kidney 
failure.90 Medicare direct dialysis costs routinely exceed $55,000 per patient per 
year.91 Illustratively, congressional efforts to legalize paired kidney donation, 
which may spur transplants, could save $500 million over a ten-year period.92 
More important, moving Black patients off of dialysis allows them to regain 
their lives and economic potential. The costs of dialysis extend beyond 
financial—they impact daily life. Treatments usually take at least three days per 
week and several hours each session, diminishing both quality of life and work 
potential.93 
C. Quantifying the Increase Organ-Donor Racial Selection Will Have on 
Supply 
According to recent Gallup poll data, 62% of Whites are willing to donate 
organs, whereas the figure falls to 39.2% among Hispanics and to 31.2% among 
Blacks.94 The survey cited high levels of distrust among Blacks to account for 
the low participation rate.95 In 2005, the same year that the Gallup survey was 
conducted, UNOS data revealed that 1136 organs were harvested and 
transplanted from Black cadavers.96 One study suggests that this number 
 
 90. See generally R.W. Evans, Organ Transplantation and the Inevitable Debate as to What 
Constitutes a Basic Health Care Benefit, in CLINICAL TRANSPLANTS 359, 359 (J. Michael Cecka & Paul 
I. Terasaki eds., 1994). 
 91. Jay Inslee, Transplant Specialists Urge Full Funding for Organ Donation Legislation, U.S. REP. 
JAY INSLEE’S ISSUES (May 10, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/inslee/issues/ 
health/organ_donation.html. 
 92. Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-216, 118 Stat. 584 (2004); 
Press Release, Congressman Jay Inslee, House Honors Fallen Colleague by Passing Kidney-Donation 
Bill (Mar. 7, 2007), http://www.house.gov/inslee/issues/health/house_passes_norwood_bill.html 
(estimating that direct paired kidney donation could save Medicaid at least $220,000 in dialysis costs 
per patient; also noting Congressional Budget Office estimation “that legalizing paired kidney donation 
would save about $30 million over 5 years and $500 million over 10 years.”); see Goodwin, The Body 
Market, supra note 57, at 634. 
 93. See Stella L. Smetanka, Who Will Protect the Disruptive Dialysis Patient, 32 AM. J. L. & MED. 
53, 54–55 (2006) (looking at the challenges facing a patient with end-stage renal disease and the dialysis 
industry in general). 
 94. See OrganDonor.gov, 2005 National Survey of Organ and Tissue Donation Attitudes and 
Behaviors Figure 6, http://www.organdonor.gov/survey2005/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2008): 
Willingness to donate is high among Latinos (49.2%), Asians (46.0%), and Whites (44.8%), 
but is significantly lower among Blacks (30.0%). An estimate of the proportion of the 
population approachable for donation can be determined by multiplying the proportion 
willing to donate times the proportion of those who haven’t granted permission to donate. 
Using this approach, one finds that 28.1% of Latinos haven’t granted permission to donate, 
yet are willing to do so. Almost as great a proportion of Asians (26.2%) fall into this category, 
but fewer Blacks (19.8%) or Whites (16.9%) do. 
 95. Id.; see also Random Samples: Who Donates Organs?, 309 SCI. 47 (2005) [hereinafter Random 
Samples] (suggesting that Black donor rates may be as low as 25% and attributing such to lack of trust); 
Study Evaluates Why Blacks Do Not Successfully Donate Kidneys, SCI. DAILY, May 9, 2007, 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/05/070508072842.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2008). 
 96. The Organ Procurement and Transplant Network, Deceased Donors Recovered in the U.S. by 
Donor Ethnicity, http://www.optn.org/latestData/rptData.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2008) (choose Data, 
then National Data set; then choose category of donor, then deceased donor by ethnicity). 
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roughly correlates with a 25% participation rate in the organ-procurement 
system.97 Assuming such, it is possible to predict the number of harvestable 
organs that might be created by an increase in Black participation. If Black 
participation increased to the current level of Hispanic participation, 2135 
organs could be harvested per year—an increase of almost 1000 organs from the 
Black community alone. If Black participation rates rose to the level of the 
national average, 2362 organs could be harvested from their communities—an 
increase of almost 1230 organs per year. Lastly, if Black participation rates 
increased to a level commensurate with that of White organ donors, 2817 
organs could be harvested from the Black community—an increase of more 
than 1680 organs per year. Even assuming a slightly less-than-perfect 
correlation between organ transplantation and lives saved, the potential 
beneficial impact of such a system is compelling. 
There are several reasons why the above calculations might both over-and 
underestimate the actual increase in supply generated by the inclusion of racial 
preferences in organ procurement. The calculations do not account for any 
increases in donation resulting from non-Black populations. Yet allowing 
greater donor control over the allocation of their organs might create a broad 
stimulant to encourage organ-donor participation across all racial subgroups. 
For example, Hispanics might galvanize around the opportunity to help other 
Hispanics through directed donations, even if Hispanics do not demonstrate a 
similar distrust of the organ procurement and allocation system. 
The calculations above may also overestimate the increase in organ supply. 
Individuals who do not become organ donors because of personal or religious 
beliefs relating to the sanctity of the human body are less likely to participate in 
organ donation regardless of racial preference. A similar response is paired to 
moral objections to organ donation. This thought experiment identifies but 
cannot resolve current information constraints that may accompany the racial 
and socioeconomic status of donors.98 As a result, individuals who do not donate 
because of information deficiencies or religious and medical fears of the 
procedure itself will likely remain outside of the system. 
IV 
THE LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF USING RACIAL PREFERENCES TO SPUR 
BLACK PARTICIPATION IN ORGAN DONATION 
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) established the process by 
which individuals may legally donate cadaveric organs.99 This Act was ratified 
by all states and the District of Columbia shortly after the first liver, pancreas, 
 
 97. Random Samples, supra note 95. 
 98. See, e.g., Why Blacks Do Not Donate More Organs, JET 15, Dec. 11, 1995, available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1355/is_n5_v89/ai_17829588 (last visited Mar. 31, 2008). 
 99. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §8A U.L.A. 69 (1968) [hereinafter UAGA]. 
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and heart transplants.100 The UAGA permits a competent adult to “give all or 
part of [his] body” for certain designated purposes, including “transplantation, 
therapy, medical or dental education, research, or advancement of medical or 
dental science.”101 The revised UAGA (1984), in compliance with NOTA, does 
not, however, allow the donor to receive “valuable consideration” for the 
transfer.102 NOTA added a federal measure on top of the UAGA regulatory 
framework, which states simply that “it shall be unlawful for any person to 
knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable 
consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate 
commerce.”103 Both the UAGA and NOTA provide for criminal penalties and 
fines for violation of any provision within the laws.104 
A. Overcoming NOTA’s Rigid Constraints: Is Promoting Racial Preferences a 
Legal Consideration? 
Neither the UAGA nor NOTA defines “valuable consideration.” The 
transfer of money in exchange for an organ seems to fall clearly within the 
scope and intent of each, yet it is unclear whether the same holds true for less-
traditional forms of exchange and economic interests, such as the expression of 
racial preferences. From a historical point of view, the ability of an individual to 
express and promote his or her racial preferences has economic value. For a 
Black organ donor desiring to correct a form of social injustice by channeling an 
organ donation to a Black patient person, this “secondary economic value”105 is 
in excess of the implicit gratification received from simple altruistic gift-giving. 
Does this secondary economic interest constitute valuable consideration? Or 
does it color the donor’s intent to such a degree that his gift of life is no longer 
considered altruistic? 
The value individuals place on race is not trivial and has been considered in 
insightful, but limited contexts, such as schooling,106 busing,107 and 
 
 100. UAGA prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. 4–7 (1987). Note that the early policy efforts to regulate 
organ transplantation occurred at the state rather than federal level as the UAGA was drafted by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). 
 101. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, §§ 7151, 7153 (2008). 
 102. Id. at § 7155. 
 103. NOTA, supra note 23. 
 104. Id. at § 274(e)(c)(2); UAGA, supra note 100 at § 5(f); TOM KOCH, SCARCE GOODS: JUSTICE, 
FAIRNESS AND ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 50–71 (2002) (noting that in NOTA Congress 
standardized the imposition of a criminal fine or imprisonment across all fifty states). 
 105. “Secondary” only in the sense that it is not directly quantifiable in terms of traditional 
economic measures such as money. In economic terms, this is known as a “shadow value.” As 
conceived, this shadow price is a form of opportunity cost that would be lost by not participating as an 
organ donor. 
 106. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, The Rehnquist Court’s Pragmatic Approach to Civil Rights, 99 NW. U. L. 
REV. 249, 279–87 (2004). 
 107. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative Action, Sodomy, 
and Supreme Court Politics, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1, 28 n.162 (2005). 
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accommodations.108 Determining the value of racial identity and its impact on 
individual decisions remains difficult. The AAOTS studies suggest that whether 
a Black person decides to become an organ donor may be related to his or her 
perceptions about the allocation and procurement system’s equity.109 In 
economic terms, perceived inequity increases the cost of becoming an organ 
donor to Blacks. If this is correct, it costs Blacks more to participate in the 
organ procurement system than any other minority group, and Blacks receive 
on average fewer benefits of organ allocation. As a result, a cascade effect may 
emerge, whereby Blacks’ perceptions of social injustice become reinforced and 
lead to even greater sensitivity to disparity in costs between themselves and 
non-Black donors. In essence, the greater cost of organ donation creates a 
disincentive for Black participation in the organ-procurement system. Ferreting 
out the exact contours of this economic relationship are beyond the scope of 
this article. The important point is simply that Black organ donors appear to 
place some value on the perceived inequities of the organ-transfer system. 
To further unpack this theory, we examined Black self-help or rescue 
models from the civil-rights era. That Blacks might place an economic value on 
their racial identity is consistent with the civil-rights legacy of individuals 
foregoing their own self-interest in response to “group” challenges or to 
promote “group” uplift. During the 1950s, many Black business owners and 
workers, including those who paved the way for litigation in Brown v. Board of 
Education,110 chose to sacrifice potential profits in support of movements to 
 
 108. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1867–68 (2006). 
 109. See supra I.B. 
 110. Brown v. Board of Education was a composite of several lawsuits against school districts and 
although most of the cases named children, with Briggs v. Elliot as an exception, those who actually 
coordinated the cases and economically underwrote the efforts on behalf of Black children were 
business owners and laborers employed at what were considered respected jobs at the time. This 
excerpt of an interview with Mrs. Briggs (a litigant) helps to place in context what the litigants and their 
supporters endured (grammar unaltered and without emphasis): 
Well, it happened to me. I was working at Summerton Motel, and this man, the work us, 
Greenborough, he work us real good. And the White Council, of Summerton, I think 
they call it the White Council, they came down there and told him that, if he didn’t fire 
the women who signed the petition, that they would close the business down. They won’t 
let the trucks come in and deliver. So then he called us in, and asked all who that signed 
the petition, would we take our name off the petition in order to work. After all, we had 
to pay $5 to take our name off the petition. I told him, no, I didn’t want to do that, 
because we be hurting the children, and I rather give my job up, and keep my name on 
there. So in about two week’s time, I was fired. 
Not only me, the rest of them who had anything to do with the petition, they all was fired. 
Annie Gibson was fired, and many more, during that time too. They—a lot of colored 
people on the white man place—they made them move, because they signed the petition. 
So they didn’t have, well I guess they find a place to go. But when you live on white man 
place, partly all your life, and when you sign a petition for your children to do better, they 
told them, said, “Well you got to go. Else take the name off the petition.” And many of 
the people decided they did not want to take the name off, and they did not take the 
name off. 
http://www.teachersdomain.org/assets/wgbh/iml04/iml04_doc_fullbriggs/iml04_doc_fullbriggs.pdf. 
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provide equitable accommodations and funding for schools.111 In real economic 
terms, they suffered. Racial uplift had its costs, but it seems that to the 
participants in the civil-rights movement, “race advancement” was more 
valuable than money. 
Black entertainers joined in by boycotting segregated music venues in the 
South, incurring economic losses and hostility from agents, touring, record 
companies and the broader entertainment industry.112 According to Bennetta 
Jules-Rosette, Josephine Baker insisted “[f]rom the outset . . . that she perform 
only for integrated audiences at every venue.”113 She even insisted that curfew 
and segregation ordinances be lifted before she would perform.114 Baker was not 
alone. Shortly before a concert in Augusta, Georgia, Ray Charles decided that 
he could no longer tolerate performing at segregated venues. In a recent 
biography, Michael Lydon describes Charles’ frustration. A telegram informing 
Charles that his performance at Paine College would be to White students only, 
invoked this response, “I had to stand behind my principles and help the 
students in their fight” for desegregation.115 His boycott came at a cost, as he was 
sued by concert promoters for breach of contract.116 
Maids, shopkeepers, school teachers, and others across socioeconomic strata 
also risked the political and economic fallout from arrests and incarcerations 
resulting from marches and protests related specifically to race-focused ideals, 
such as the integration of schools in New Orleans and of lunch counters in 
Tennessee.117 Indeed, the infamous walk in the spring of 1965 across the 
Edmund Pettus Bridge, commonly known as “Bloody Sunday,” stands out as a 
moment that demonstrates in social, economic, and political contexts what 
Blacks were willing to wager for the right of other Blacks to vote.118 The 
hundreds that marched across the bridge were not simply advocating for their 
 
 111. Even musicians and artists boycotted profitable music tours in the South because of 
discrimination against local Blacks. E.g., Theodore Strongin, Boycott Efforts in Arts Continue, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 11, 1964. 
 112. For example, Josephine Baker was derided as being “difficult” and too political because she 
refused to perform in segregated music venues. See BENNETTA JULES-ROSETTE, JOSEPHINE BAKER IN 
ART AND LIFE, 221–22 (2007). Marian Anderson, Paul Robeson, Hazel Scott, Ray Charles, and other 
preeminent Black musicians boycotted segregated venues. See ALLAN KEILER, MARIAN ANDERSON: 
A SINGER’S JOURNEY 255–59 (2000) (documenting Anderson’s decision to boycott segregated music 
venues and the political fallout that transpired). See also MICHAEL LYDON, RAY CHARLES: MAN AND 
MUSIC 196–97 (2004). 
 113. See JULES-ROSETTE, supra note 112, at 221. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See LYDON, supra note 112 at 196–97. 
 116. Id. at 197. 
 117. There is real economic value to boycotts. They obviously impact business from those who 
would otherwise go to the lunch counter, but they also symbolize the potential for expanded 
consumers. See, e.g., JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, 
CRITICS, CONTESTATIONS 51–52 (2000). 
 118. See U.S. Department of State, FREE AT LAST: THE U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 57–61 
(2008), available at http://www.america.gov/media/pdf/books/free-at-last.pdf; Selma-to-Montgomery 
March, U.S. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, available at http://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/civilrights/al4.htm. 
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individual rights to vote, but something more.119 The decision to march was 
calculated, though, and Blacks were not naïve about the risks they exposed 
themselves and their children to for the sake of liberating other Blacks.120 
One way of observing the economic value Blacks place on race 
considerations is by understanding where Blacks donate their financial 
resources. Blacks give 25% more of their discretionary income to charity than 
Whites do.121 One could interpret this as Blacks being, on average, more 
generous than Whites, at least in terms of their money. Their giving may also be 
linked to identity causes and movements. Blacks are more likely to donate to 
the NAACP and other not-for-profit organizations that promote civil-rights 
agendas than their White counterparts.122 This may be either the cause or the 
result of more targeted public-relations campaigns.123 
Altruism and individual identity are inextricably linked. An individual is 
most likely to donate to those organizations and causes that promote the 
expression of his or her own identity.124 This may be because “both peer 
pressure and belief in an institution play a role when donors give generously.”125 
But the trend might be even broader. For instance, Blacks who make between 
$30,000 and $50,000 donate an average of $528 annually, compared with $462 
donated by their White counterparts in the same income range.126 
But the question remains: Why are Blacks, who appear more generous and 
altruistic than Whites with comparable spending power, not equally generous 
with their organs? The simplest explanation is that Blacks can control who 
receives their money but cannot control who receives their organs. Despite 
increases in organ donors by 26% in the past twelve years, Blacks’ participation 
is miniscule compared to other minority groups.127 
 
 119. Blacks were met with such extreme violence that the incident made international news. 
 120. FREE AT LAST, supra, note 118. 
 121. Eric Gondawe, Charity Statistics in the US, http://www.zambian.com/bethel/orphanage-
ministry-resources-online/html/charity-statistics.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2007). 
 122. Alice Lukens, The Science of Smart Giving: Organizers of a New Program in Baltimore Want 
Wealthier African-Americans to Embrace Setting Up Foundations and Trusts, THE BALTIMORE SUN, 
Jan. 10, 2001, at 1A. 
 123. The question is most recently addressed by bloggers debating the fairness of the NAACP using 
advertising slogans insinuating that donations are going to the Jena Six Defense Fund, when in fact 
such donations travel to a NAACP general fund. Too Sense: Race, Politics, and Hip Hop, NAACP 
Alters Its Website to Link to Jena Six Defense Fund, available at 
http://halfricanrevolution.blogspot.com/2007/07/is-national-naacp-profiteering-off-jena_27.html (last 
visited March 31, 2008). 
 124. Alice Lukens, supra, note 122. 
 125. See Susan Jacoby, Why Do We Donate? It’s Personal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1997, at G1. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Random Samples, supra note 95 (“Whereas about 62% of whites and Asians are willing to 
donate organs, the figure falls to 47% among Hispanics and 25% among Blacks.”). 
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B. Racial Preferences as Valued Consideration 
The UNOS attempts to explain the contours of “valuable consideration” 
using the notion of donative intent. In essence, this distinction suggests that 
donations given in response to “valuable consideration” do not have the 
requisite altruistic intent. Some have gone so far as to suggest that “a preference 
might be considered ‘valuable consideration’ for an organ donation,” and thus, 
“to avoid any confusion, laws that now ban compensation for organs should be 
amended to add this form of reciprocity/insurance to the list already exempted 
from such bans.”128 One thing is certain—determining donative intent is a 
tenuous proposition. Even within the UNOS policy itself, contradictions exist. 
For example, the UNOS condones “living donation arrangements” as not 
involving “valuable consideration,” but condemns paired kidney transplants as 
counter to the intention of organ legislation even though in both cases the 
intentions of individual donors cases appear identical.129 
Of course, it can be argued that using racial preferences to encourage Blacks 
to become organ donors does not provide valuable consideration; rather, it 
merely directs donations toward a particular subpopulation. Unlike the case of 
a contract or paired transplant, donors would remain unaware of the identity of 
their organ recipient aside from the recipient’s race. In turn, the relationship 
between donor and recipient remains attenuated enough that incentives for 
extra-legal arrangements are of no concern.130 
C. The Tension Between Promoting Racial Preferences and Equality: Does 
Using Race to Promote Organ Donation Raise Constitutional Equal 
Protection Issues? 
The values individuals place on racial preferences often lie in tension with 
democratic principles promoting equality across racial strata. But this was not 
always the case. Through the 1950s and 1960s, legal segregation gave deference 
to individual racial preferences at the expense of equality, especially in 
elementary, secondary, and higher education in southern states.131 Because the 
Supreme Court initially interpreted separate as equal in Plessy v. Ferguson,132 
this tension did not create constitutional concerns.133 In turn, the Court 
protected the expression of White racial preferences and subgroup interest at 
the detriment of Blacks. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court reversed its 
 
 128. Mark S. Nadel & Caroline A. Nadel, Commentary, Using Reciprocity to Motivate Organ 
Donations, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y LAW & ETHICS 293, 321 (2005). 
 129. See Goodwin, The Body Market, supra note 57. 
 130. This argument is of primary importance in response to those arguing against commodification 
of organs because of the risk of economic coercion. Gilbert Meileander, Gifts of the Body, NEW 
ATLANTIS 25 (Summer 2006). 
 131. See generally Alfreda A. Sellers Diamond, Black, White, Brown, Green, and Fordice: the Flavor 
of Higher Education in Louisiana and Mississippi, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 57, 61 (2008). 
 132. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 133. Id. at 548. 
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prior jurisprudence and refused to give deference to the expression of racial 
preferences when doing so was at the expense of equality across races.134 Such 
concerns arose in the context of Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection 
claims.135 
Allowing organ donors to select the race of their recipients shifts the 
decision-making entity in organ allocation from the government to the 
individual. What remains, however, is to contemplate what role, if any, the 
government then has in enforcing antidiscrimination policies in the context of 
organ transfers. The constitutionality of government action is reviewed under 
strict scrutiny when it distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of racial 
classification.136 As a threshold matter, the constitutionality of a race-based 
solution to organ supply which places the use of racial criteria at the discretion 
of potential donors should escape strict-scrutiny analysis. However, the state’s 
role in such a program would likely not be de minimis, as the burdens of 
administering the race-based program might be assumed by the government.137 
As such, it may be appropriate to analyze the constitutionality of the program 
in light of the strict-scrutiny framework, regardless of the nongovernmental 
nature of the decision-maker. 
The Court stated in Grutter v. Bollinger that “[w]hen race-based action is 
necessary to further a compelling state interest such action does not violate the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection so long as the narrow-tailoring 
requirement is also satisfied.”138 In the educational context, the Court has found 
that two such compelling government interests are remedying past intentional 
discrimination and increasing student body diversity in higher education.139 As 
previously stated, the Court has found diversity in higher education to be a 
compelling interest under a strict-scrutiny analysis.140 Allowing the use of racial 
preferences in an organ transfer system may be easily seen as a means to 
remedy past discrimination or save a life. Organ diversity, however, does not 
squarely map onto the Court’s discussion of diversity as a compelling state 
interest under a constitutional strict- scrutiny analysis. According to Justice 
Roberts, “[t]he diversity interest was not focused on race alone but 
encompassed ‘all factors that may contribute to student body diversity.’”141 In 
 
 134. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 135. Id. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2000), likewise 
directly addresses racial preferences by eliminating practices that lead to the disparate treatment of 
employees or job applicants on the basis of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
 136. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 519 (1989). 
 137. We are agnostic on this matter. It might be that the government is not the best entity to 
implement a progressive organ-transplant policy. These issues might be better dealt with by private 
organizations. 
 138. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326–27 (2003). 
 139. See, e.g., 488 U.S. 469; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 140. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
 141. Parents Involved in Community Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1., 551 U.S. 701, 703 (quoting 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337). 
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Grutter, the Court held that a state law-school admissions process was narrowly 
tailored to obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student 
body, even though it denied certain students admission to the law school on the 
basis of race.142 The implication of Grutter is that a state may constitutionally 
restrict an individual’s choice in attending a particular institution if a compelling 
diversity-based reason exists to do so. In the case of organ donation, no 
compelling diversity-based reason exists upon which limitations on individual 
choice may be justified. An organ recipient gains no additional utility by 
receiving an organ from a donor of a different race. Unlike racial preference in 
the education context, organ diversity does not seem a compelling reason to 
restrict individual choice. Rather, individuals should be allowed to choose if, 
and within broad categories, to whom they wish to donate their organs post 
mortem.143 
D. Pitfalls of Race Preference? 
Every institution has its drawbacks.144 Some institutions are far more 
burdened than others and thus become less efficient and effective over time.145 
Other institutions become the ideal (or at least less-burdened) mediums for 
transactions typically reserved for first-choice institutions.146 What is important 
in each case is to match supply with demand.147 Even in the best cases of 
equilibrium there may be externalities. 
At first blush, one might want to analogize to the use of racial preferences in 
reproductive markets as another example of a race-positive transfer system. 
One drawback to comparing race preferences in organ versus reproductive 
markets, though, is that the two do not map evenly. The use of racial 
preferences in the adoption process and selection of sperm for artificial 
insemination is a family-planning decision. Though there is no explicit reference 
to family-planning decisions in the Constitution, these are the types of rights to 
which the government generally defers to individual choice.148 Individual choices 
expressing racial preferences in organ markets, however, are not choices 
regarding family planning. Instead, such decisions center on issues of public 
health and safety—realms in which government regulation typically trumps 
individual preference.149 Thus, critics of our proposal might argue that the state 
 
 142. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337. 
 143. As living donors, individuals may choose to whom they wish to donate within the most narrow 
category possible—selection of an actual recipient. 
 144. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
OF RIGHTS (2001). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See, e.g., Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State 
Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204 (1982). 
 149. Buck v. Bell offers a troubling example of state interest through its public-health police power 
trumping individual choice, even in the realm of reproduction. 274 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1927). In that case, 
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interest in maintaining a color-blind system of organ transfer is consistent with 
laws against organ commodification and hard-won civil-rights battles and 
should thus be upheld. 
But if we unpack the Court’s decisions upon which such criticisms are based, 
it is clear that honoring racial preferences leads to a protection of individual 
choice through the privacy interest “implicit in the meaning of the Bill of 
Rights.”150 In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court held that this fundamental right 
encompassed a married couple’s right to privacy when making family-planning 
decisions, including the decision to choose to use birth control.151 Similarly, in 
Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey,152 
the Court recognized certain areas over which individuals have private control. 
Allowing racial preferences in deciding to whom an organ is given is not 
inconsistent with these principles. Critics might argue that race preference in 
organ transplantation is a form of reverse discrimination or that it would 
approve overt discrimination against Blacks by Whites who might choose to 
withhold their organs from Blacks (and all minorities). These arguments are 
seductive and commonly evoked in affirmative-action debates.153 But do they 
have any real traction in the context of organ transplantation? These issues may 
be outside of the ambit of the Good Samaritan principles codified in NOTA 
and the application of that ethos in American culture and law. The truth is that 
we do not enforce a duty to rescue; it is absent from our common-law 
tradition.154 
V 
CONCLUSION 
We proposed a simple thought experiment that, if viable, could serve as a 
solution to help ameliorate the problem of organ supply, particularly for Blacks. 
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The hypothesis pushing this article is that by allowing individual control over 
the recipients of their donated organs, more people will likely become donors. 
The idea is presently captured in the appeal of internet-based organ-donation 
sites like Matchingdonor.com. Self-selection is a tipping point for potential 
Black donors, with significant economic and social consequences. Not 
surprisingly, associations with any affinity group might help to facilitate an 
overall increase in organ donations. One could imagine Polish church groups in 
Chicago participating in an organ-sharing program or Albanian fraternities in 
California, and Cape Verdean community groups in Rhode Island doing the 
same. 
Blacks remain suspicious of the U.S. medical system in general and of the 
transplant system in particular. In large part, their discomfort might stem from a 
history of being subjects of medical experiments without consent (or 
knowledge) and the facts that they wait longer for organs than any other racial 
group and that they experience the highest rates of death among all participants 
in the U.S. transplant system. Dismissing such concerns as irrational hyperbole 
fails to take into account the actual disparities resulting from the current 
transplant regime. 
The use of racial preferences as a decision-making criterion addresses the 
distributional problems of organ allocation and could promote parity by giving 
organ suppliers some sense of control. Preferences are consistent with the way 
in which regulations function in other areas of biological transfer, such as the 
adoption process and the purchase of reproductive goods such as ova, sperm, 
and the renting of wombs for artificial insemination. The altruistic system of 
organ procurement and allocation is failing to provide an adequate supply of 
organs for those in need of life-saving transplantation. The critical issues, as of 
yet unresolved by the UNOS are how to increase organ supply and, holding all 
else equal, how to overcome resistance to organ sharing. In this article, we 
document that a significant, if not prevailing, reason for lower participation 
rates in Black communities is an underlying distrust of the transplant system. 
Based on the conclusions drawn from our hypotheses, permitting racial 
preferences in organ allocation directly addresses the concerns raised by Blacks. 
